"De ente et essentia" from Thomas Aquinas. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), sanctus, doctor Ecclesiae catholicae, theologus italianus et philosophus mediaevalis.

The present paper deals with the notion of essence in Thomas Aquinas. Part 1 focuses on the main points of Aquinas’s doctrine of essence set out in his De ente et essentia, and especially on the concept of essence as the “form of the whole” and the concept of the “nature considered absolutely”. The comparison with the teaching of Aristotle and Aquinas’s Arabic predecessors in Part 2 shows that Thomas’s notion of essence is an innovative re-interpretation, which he (...) largely owes to Avicenna, of the original Peripatetic doctrine. Nevertheless, it is shown that this re-interpretation is to be understood as a result of Avicenna’s and Aquinas’s effort to provide a consistent explanation of various statements in Aristotle’s writings, not always compatible with each other. (shrink)

By providing a phenomenological presentation of Aquinas’s duplex operatio intellectus, the author argues that a reader is better equipped to understand where and when Aquinas arrives at the real distinction between essence and existence in the much disputed De Ente et Essentia, chapter four. “Phenomenological presentation” means an honest description of one’s own mental life as it conducts the duplex operatio. From phenomenological observations in the Thomistic texts, the author argues that a penetrative and rebounding movement of attention (...) upon some initially presented multiplicity characterizes the duplex operatio. When this dynamic is conducted upon the multiplicity of a real thing juxtaposed to itself cognitionally existing in sensation, the rebound of the secunda operatio presents the real existence in a sui generis relation of priority to the individual thing understood as existence neutral. Unfortunately, the rebound of attention is too quick to discern accurately the nature of the borderline between the attribute of existence and its subject, the individual thing. The attribute of existence may actuate the thing by shading into it or by remaining distinct from it. Fortunately, the phenomenological situation is sufficient to leave phenomenology and to initiate the third intellectual operation of reasoning. Reasoning concludes to a first cause of phenomenologically observable attributive existence. In this first cause existence is the thing itself. In order for this first cause to have its proper effect corresponding to what it is, the author argues that the second of the above two alternatives for phenomenologically observable attributive existence must be the true one. After linking these reflections to stages of De Ente, chapter 4, the author critically relates them to other interpretations of the text. These interpretations include those of Cahalan, McDonald, Wippel, Dewan, Patt, Kenny, and Owens. (shrink)

Aquinas’s name is practically synonymous with attempts at proving the existence of God. In this article I offer an interpretation and defense of a much neglected argument from Aquinas’s works, that of De Ente et Essentia Cap. IV. Therein Aquinas presents quite a youthful and in my view compelling argument for the existence of God. To begin with, I present an interpretation of the argument and on the basis of this interpretation I suggest that the argument has a (...) prima facie plausibility to it. Thereafter I consider several criticisms that are relevant to the argument, yet not compelling in my view. I conclude that the argument from the De Ente survives the criticisms leveled against it in this paper, in which case if one accepts the methodological framework that Aquinas adopts, then one ought to accept that Aquinas’s argument for God in the De Ente succeeds in what it sets out to do: to establish the existence of a single, immaterial, self-subsisting act of being, which we understand to be God. (shrink)

The purpose of the article is to offer a detailed exegetical analysis of the argument in chapter four of "de ente et essentia" in which aquinas argues for a distinction between "esse" and essence and to develop an interpretation of it on the basis of the analysis. I argue that the reconstructed argument shows that aquinas argues for a real distinction and that he establishes it earlier in the argument than some commentators have thought. I criticize a rival (...) interpretation of the argument defended recently by joseph owens. (shrink)

In this paper I explore methodological approaches to Aquinas’s argument for a real distinction between essence and existence in creatures in De ente et essentia. Joseph Owens and John Wippel examine the text through three stages that, they conclude, result in a demonstration for the real distinction. I contrast this approach with R. E. Houser, who argues that Aquinas’s text, which proceeds dialectically, must be understood within the context of its sources, namely, Avicenna’s Metaphysics of the Healing and (...) The Intentions of the Philosophers by al-Ghazali. First, I will offer an evaluative judgment on the disagreement between Owens and Wippel on which stage Aquinas demonstrates a real distinction. Second, I will offer an evaluative judgment on the nature of the treatise as a whole by suggesting that the methodology of source-based contextualism offers another way to read the De ente. (shrink)

This paper explores the Aristotelian context of the real distinction between existence and essence thought to be posited in Thomas Aquinas’ early workDe Ente Et Essentia. In doing so, the paper situates its own position in the context of contemporary scholarship and in relation to the contemporary trend to downplay Aristotle’s influence in Thomas Aquinas’ philosophy. The paper argues that re-readingDe Ente Et Essentiain this way sheds new light on some of the crucial debates in contemporary Thomist (...) scholarship, particularly with respect to the analogous relation between potency and act: essence and existence, the distinction between conceptual and causal explanation, and the relationship between philosophy and theology in the thought of Thomas Aquinas. (shrink)

Aquinas’s name is practically synonymous with attempts at proving the existence of God. In this article I offer an interpretation and defense of a much neglected argument from Aquinas’s works, that of De Ente et Essentia Cap. IV. Therein Aquinas presents quite a youthful and in my view compelling argument for the existence of God. To begin with, I present an interpretation of the argument and on the basis of this interpretation I suggest that the argument has a (...) prima facie plausibility to it. Thereafter I consider several criticisms that are relevant to the argument, yet not compelling in my view. I conclude that the argument from the De Ente survives the criticisms leveled against it in this paper, in which case if one accepts the methodological framework that Aquinas adopts, then one ought to accept that Aquinas’s argument for God in the De Ente succeeds in what it sets out to do: to establish the existence of a single, immaterial, self-subsisting act of being, which we understand to be God. (shrink)

RESUMEN: El presente trabajo pretende estudiar la cuestión de los universales tal como Tomás de Aquino la aborda en su trabajo De ente et essentia. Busca dilucidar el modo de ser propio de los universales en tanto que accidente de la esencia absoluta presente en el entendimiento. Esto no conduce a un nominalismo ya que la esencia entendida es idéntica a la naturaleza existente en el individuo particular, desde el punto de vista de su ser absoluto. Es, en (...) efecto, el ser absoluto de la esencia y su indiferencia con respecto a su darse, ya sea en el particular, ya sea en el entendimiento, lo que posibilita la posesión intencional del ser de lo otro que es precisamente aquello en lo que el conocer consiste en cuanto tal. ABSTRACT: The following work attempts to review the issue of the universals such as Thomas Aquinas did in his work De ente et essentia. It pretends to elucidate the specific way of being of the universals as an accident of the absolute essence present in the mind. This does not lead to nominalism because the understood essence is identical to the nature existing in the particular. This way of being of the essence is what precisely allows knowledge as an intentional possession of reality. (shrink)

Aquinas and the problem of matter and form in the "Fons vitae."--Augustine and the problem of matter and form.--Aquinas answers Avicebron: the distinction between essence and existence.--Bibliography (p.[123]-127).

Aquinas’s name is practically synonymous with attempts at proving the existence of God. In this article I offer an interpretation and defense of a much neglected argument from Aquinas’s works, that of De Ente et Essentia Cap. IV. Therein Aquinas presents quite a youthful and in my view compelling argument for the existence of God. To begin with, I present an interpretation of the argument and on the basis of this interpretation I suggest that the argument has a (...) prima facie plausibility to it. Thereafter I consider several criticisms that are relevant to the argument, yet not compelling in my view. I conclude that the argument from the De Ente survives the criticisms leveled against it in this paper, in which case if one accepts the methodological framework that Aquinas adopts, then one ought to accept that Aquinas’s argument for God in the De Ente succeeds in what it sets out to do: to establish the existence of a single, immaterial, self-subsisting act of being, which we understand to be God. (shrink)

The way in which early followers of St. Thomas Aquinas interpreted or misinterpreted his metaphysical doctrines and works still needs much exploration, so a text edition and editor’s commentary of this kind is a most welcomed project, especially since Conrad of Prussia has possibly left us the earliest commentary on Aquinas’ De ente et essentia. The editing task is a precarious work, however, since Conrad’s commentary survives in only one known manuscript, located in the monastery library at Admont, (...) Austria. The editors’ printed result thus has a number of flaws, but without a copy of the codex it is impossible to say which derive from the manuscript and which from the editors. Without a text a reviewer cannot legitimately correct, but can only suggest alternatives to evident mistakes. In the first lectio there is a very humorous flaw. Conrad is trying to prove that little mistakes can sometimes lead to big ones. The edited text illustrates: "omnis canis creditur, celeste sydus est canis, ergo celeste sidus creditur. Interum: quidquid creditur, habet pedes; celeste sydus, ut dictum est, creditur; ergo habet pedes. Ecce quot inconvenientia sequuntur ex uno modico errore." Creditur makes no sense: "Every dog is believed."? Currit does make sense: "Every dog runs." Unwittingly the editors prove the point the author wanted to make. By misreading or failing to correct the fundamental word currit so frequently it grew into a big error. It grew into an even bigger one later because Professor Bobik’s commentary on this text is an explanation based on this faulty text. (shrink)

In current theology the possibility of conclusive arguments for the existence of God is largely rejected by reference to Hume or Kant. Purportedly post-metaphysical surrogates are put in place of a metaphysically founded theology, where either the existence of God may be believed in only as a rational possibility, or else a radical constructivism about the existence of God is fallen into. Nevertheless, in the following, a conclusive metaphysical argument for the existence of God in the tradition of scholastic metaphysics (...) is formulated. It is shown that theological talk of creatio ex nihilo is only the other side of this metaphysical argument: Whoever accepts creatio ex nihilo cannot consistently deny the soundness of the argument. (shrink)